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ABSTRACT
As one of the representative blockchain platforms, Ethereum has
attracted lots of attacks. Due to the potential financial loss, there is
a pressing need to detect malicious smart contracts and understand
their behaviors. Though there exist multiple systems for smart
contract analysis, they cannot efficiently analyze a large number of
transactions and re-execute smart contracts to introspect malicious
behaviors.
In this paper, we urge for a transaction-centric security analyt-
ics framework for Ethereum, which provides an efficient way to
quickly locate suspicious ones from a large number of transac-
tions and extensible way to detect malicious smart contracts with
analyst-provided scripts. We present the system design in the pa-
per, which solves three technical challenges, i.e., incomplete states,
scalability and extensibility. We have implemented a prototype
system named EthScope to solve these challenges. In particular,
the first component Data Aggregator collects and recovers critical
blockchain states. The second component Replay Engine is able
to replay arbitrary and a large number of transactions. The third
component Instrumentation Framework exposes interfaces for an
analyst to dynamically instrument smart contracts and introspect
the execution of suspicious transactions. The comprehensive evalu-
ation with six types of attacks demonstrated the effectiveness of
our system. The performance evaluation shows that our system
can perform a large scale analysis on suspicious transactions (more
than 8million ones) and has a speed up of around 2, 300x compared
with the JSTracer provided by Go-Ethereum. To engage the com-
munity, we will release our system and a dataset of detected attacks
on https://github.com/zjuicsr/ethscope.
1 INTRODUCTION
With an explosive growth of the blockchain technique, Ethereum [1]
has become one of representative platforms. One reason is possibly
due to its inborn support of smart contracts. Developers use smart
contracts to build DApps (decentralized applications), ranging from
gaming, lottery, decentralized finance (DeFi), and cryptocurrency,
e.g., ERC20 tokens [5].
∗Corresponding author.
At the same time, attacks targeting Ethereum are increasing. By
exploiting vulnerabilities of smart contracts, attackers could make
huge profits in a short time. For instance, in April 2016, attackers ex-
ploited the reentrancy vulnerability in the DAO smart contract and
stole around 3.6 million Ether [48]. Attackers used the similar vul-
nerability to attack the decentralized exchange Uniswap [28] (July
2019) and DeFi (Decentralized Finance) application Lend.Me [27]
(April, 2020). Besides, lots of other types of attacks have been ob-
served in the wild [14, 16, 18].
Due to the huge financial loss, there is a pressing need to detect
malicious smart contracts and understand their behaviors, which
is crucial for effective solutions to mitigate the threat.
Existing approaches Existing approaches are mainly analyzing
smart contracts to detect vulnerable ones. However, interactions
between multiple smart contracts during real attacks make them
ineffective to detect malicious ones. Specifically, a real attack usu-
ally requires the involvement of more than one smart contract.
They interact with each other using internal transactions, which are
similar to remote procedure calls in traditional computer programs.
To detect malicious smart contracts, a system should have the ca-
pability to analyze their interactions (transactions) and re-execute
(replay) smart contracts to observe malicious behaviors.
Specifically, existing systems roughly fall into two categories.
The first category includes systems that mainly focus on the analy-
sis of smart contract code, instead of transactions. They use static
and dynamic methods [30, 35, 41, 43, 50], the fuzzing testing [38,
39, 42, 52] and the formal verification [40, 45, 49, 51] to analyze
smart contracts and asses the security of them. Such approaches
only provide a static view of smart contract code, i.e., whether they
are vulnerable or not. They cannot provide a dynamic view of con-
tract interactions (or transactions). The second category includes
systems [31, 36, 37, 46] that hook into the Ethereum Virtual Ma-
chine (EVM) at runtime to detect malicious behaviors. However,
they either need to re-execute all historical transactions (a time-
consuming process) or leverage the JavaScript-based transaction
tracing (JSTracer) [12] of the popular Ethereum client Geth [4] to
monitor smart contract execution. This tracing mechanism is ineffi-
cient due to its frequent context switches between the EVM and the
tracer (see the comparison result in Table 6). As a result, they suffer
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from the scalability issue when performing a large-scale analysis.
For instance, we need to replay more than 8 millions transactions
to detect the bad randomness attack (Section 5.3).
Transaction-centric approach Weurge for a transaction-centric
security analytics framework for Ethereum, which provides an effi-
cient way to quickly locate suspicious ones from a large number
of transactions and an extensible way to detect malicious smart
contracts with analyst-provided scripts.
Specifically, instead of solely analyzing smart contract code, an
analyst first locates suspicious transactions from multiple perspec-
tives. For instance, transactions that create a loop between smart
contracts, and transactions interact with vulnerable contracts re-
ported by existing systems [40, 41, 43, 50, 51] are suspicious. After
that, suspicious transactions are re-executed (or replayed) using a
replay engine (a customized Ethereum Virtual Machine) to monitor
the execution of smart contracts. Analyst-provided scripts will be
invoked at certain places (instrumentation points in this paper) to
spot malicious behaviors and detect malicious contracts.
Note that, our approach does not intend to replace existing sys-
tems [30, 35, 39–41, 43, 45, 49–51], but complements them to provide
capabilities to detect malicious smart contracts. In fact, the output
of existing systems could be a hint to locate suspicious transac-
tions. For instance, transactions interact with vulnerable contracts
reported by them are suspicious.
Though the basic idea is straightforward, building such a frame-
work faces several technical challenges.
(1) Incomplete states. In order to quickly locate suspicious transac-
tions, the framework should collect rich chain states and provide
an efficient interface to look up them. Note that, some critical
intermediate states (Section 2.3) are not stored in Ethereum
nodes by default.
(2) Scalability. The framework should have the capability to ef-
ficiently replay a large number of and arbitrary transactions.
Replaying a transaction is not an easy task, since the execution
depends on blockchain historical states. Existing approaches
that re-execute all or partial transactions [31, 36, 37, 46, 47] to
recover historical states are not scalable.
(3) Extensibility. The framework should be extensible to detect
different types of attacks by providing different scripts, with-
out the need to change the framework itself. Moreover, the
performance overhead should be optimized, e.g., reducing the
number of context switches between analysis scripts and the
framework.
We have designed a framework with three components to solve
these challenges. Specifically, the first component, i.e., Data Ag-
gregator , collects and recovers critical blockchain states, including
internal transactions, self-destructed smart contracts, account bal-
ance of each block, and etc. These states are usually missed or
incomplete in publicly available services [3, 29] and research pro-
totypes [33, 34]. It also provides an efficient interface to quickly
locate suspicious transactions.
The second component, i.e., Replay Engine, is able to efficiently
replay arbitrary and a large number of transactions. First, our sys-
tem takes snapshots of the historical states for each transaction.
Thus it can replay arbitrary transactions without executing unnec-
essary ones to recover historical states. Note that, the recovery of
historical states is a time-consuming process, which even makes the
analysis impossible when the number of transactions is huge. Sec-
ond, it parallelizes the replay process with multithreading, which
speeds up this process.
The third component, i.e., Instrumentation Framework, exposes
interfaces for an analyst to dynamically instrument smart contracts
and introspect the execution of suspicious transactions. An ana-
lyst can develop analysis scripts (using the JavaScript language)
to analyze suspicious transactions and detect malicious ones. Our
framework reduces the performance overhead by a fine-grained
design of instrumentation points and minimizes context switches
between the EVM and the analysis script. Compared with the JS-
Tracer [12] supported in Geth that will be triggered for each opcode,
our framework is more flexible and efficient (Table 6). To ease the
development of analysis scripts, our framework is equipped with a
dynamic taint analysis engine that could be directly invoked with
well-defined APIs.
We have implemented a prototype system named EthScope. In
particular, Data Aggregator is implemented with around 1, 137 lines
of changes to the Geth client. It uses the distributed search and
analytics engine Elasticsearch [6] to store recovered blockchain
states and provide an interface to query transactions. The Replay
Engine and Instrumentation Framework are implemented with 5, 191
lines of changes to EVM.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our system, we use it to detect
six types of attacks and report the result of two representative
ones in the paper. Specifically, it successfully detected reentrancy
attacks that have happened in the wild. Compared with other state-
of-the-art tools, it can detect more vulnerable contracts that were
previously unknown, while at the same time, has low false positive
rate. We also present the result of detecting the bad randomness at-
tack and understanding the attacker’s behaviors. The performance
evaluation shows that our system is more efficient (around 2, 300x
speed up) than existing ones when replaying transactions.
In summary, this paper makes the following main contributions:
• We proposed a transaction-centric approach to detect malicious
smart contracts on Ethereum. It first locates suspicious transac-
tions and then re-executes them to confirm the malicious behav-
iors.
• We implemented a prototype and illustrated methods to address
three technical challenges, i.e., how to recover blockchain states
and efficiently look up suspicious ones, how to replay arbitrary
transactions, and how to provide extensible interfaces to instru-
ment and introspect smart contract execution.
• We evaluated our system to detect six types of attacks occurred in
Ethereum and presented the result of two representative attacks.
The performance evaluation shows that our system is muchmore
efficient (2, 300x speed up) when replaying transactions.
To engage the community, we will released our system and a
dataset of detected attacks on https://github.com/zjuicsr/ethscope.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Ethereum Accounts
Each account in Ethereum has an address and associated balance
in Ether. There exist two types of accounts, i.e., externally owned
account (EOA) and smart contract account, respectively. EOAs
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Figure 1: Normal and internal transactions. N: normal trans-
actions; I: internal transactions.
are controlled by private keys, while smart contract accounts are
controlled by their contract code [2]. Note that, both accounts can
have Ether and other tokens, thus are associated with balances 1.
The address of a new smart contract is calculated from the num-
ber of transactions being sent (nonce) and the address of its creator,
which is the account that creates the smart contract. Due to this,
the newly created contract address is predictable by its creator. We
will illustrate an attack that exploits this property in Section 5.3.
2.2 Transactions
A transaction is a type of message call that serves three purposes,
i.e., transferring Ether, deploying a smart contract, and invoking
functions of a smart contract. Transactions on the Ethereum are
normally initiated from EOAs, hence the name normal transactions.
Besides, there exists another type of transactions that are initi-
ated from a smart contract. They are called internal transactions,
which are used to invoke functions inside another smart contract,
or transfer Ether to other accounts. For instance, the opcode CALL
can be used to invoke a function of another smart contract, thus
creating an internal transaction.
Note that, an internal transaction is always initiated from a
normal transaction, since the smart contract that creates an internal
transaction should be executed in the first place (from an EOA using
a normal transaction.) Moreover, a normal transaction could create a
large number of internal transactions, if the invoked smart contract
does so (invoking functions of other smart contracts.)
Figure 1 shows an overview of normal and internal transactions.
2.3 Ethereum States
Ethereum nodes are devices participating in validating transactions.
After synchronizing from the network as a full node, we can retrieve
states about the blockchain, e.g., the number of blocks and transac-
tions, from the node. We call the full blockchain data available on
the disk of a full Ethereum node as chain states.
Besides, there exists another type of blockchain states called
intermediate states. They are generated during the execution and
validation of transactions, including internal transactions and histor-
ical states of accounts (including EOAs and smart contract accounts.)
Historical states include the time-serial data about the change of
balance, nonce, storage and code of each account in each block.
They are crucial when replaying transactions. For instance, when
re-executing an internal transaction T in the block B that invokes a
function F in the smart contract S, we need to know the historical
states of S when T was packed and executed in block B on the
chain.
1A smart contract account can have balances may contradict one’s intuition.
Normally, a full Ethereum node only contains chain states. When
synchronizing from the network, users can specify an option, e.g.,
–gcmode=archive in Geth, to retain intermediate states with the cost
of storage space. After that, users can use debug.trace_transaction
API to re-run a transaction (or re-execute the smart contract) in
the exact same manner as it was executed on the network. How-
ever, this method is not efficient. We will discuss the way used in
our system to improve the performance of the replay process in
Section 4.2.
2.4 Smart Contracts
Ethereum virtual machine A smart contract is a program that
runs on an underlying Ethereum virtual machine (EVM for short) to
transit the global state of the Ethereum network. A smart contract
is usually programmed using a high level language, e.g., solidity,
and then is compiled into low-level machine instructions (called
opcodes), which will be fetched, decoded and executed by EVM.
EVM is a stack-based virtual machine. It has a virtual stack with
1, 024 elements. All computations are performed on the stack. It
means the operands, the result of intermediate operations are stored
on the stack. For instance, when executing the ADD opcode to add
two operands, EVM will pop two values from the stack, add them
together and then push the result on the stack.
Besides the stack, there are four other types of data locations
in EVM, memory, storage, input field, and ret field. The memory,
input data and ret field are used to store temporary data such as
function arguments, local variables, and return values. They are
volatile, which means their values will be lost when the execution
of a smart contract is finished. In contrast, the storage is a (per-
account) persistent key-value store. It is used to maintain state
variables of a smart contract in each block. For instance, a gaming
smart contract could leverage the storage to maintain the balance
of each player in each block.
Function invocation As discussed in Section 2.2, internal trans-
actions are used to invoke smart contract functions. This is achieved
through executing a message call [23] launched by six opcodes,
including CALL, CALLCODE, DELEGATECALL, STATICCALL, CREATE and
CREATE2.
In a smart contract, there is a signature (four bytes) to denote the
destination function that will be invoked. The signature is defined
as the first four bytes of the hash value (SHA3) of the canonical
representation of the function, including the function name and
the parenthesized list of parameter types. Since this is a one-way
function, it is hard to retrieve the function name from the signature.
However, there is an online service [21] that we can lookup the
function name given a signature.
Smart contract creation and destruction A smart contract
could be created using two opcodes, i.e., CREATE and CREATE2. Both
opcodes behave similar, except the way to calculate the address of
the newly created smart contract [10].
A smart contract could be self-destructed through the opcode
SELFDESTRUCT. This opcode destroys the smart contract itself, and
transfers all the Ether inside the contract to the address specified
in the parameters of this opcode (the target address). However,
if the account with the target address does not exist, this opcode
3
Table 1: States that could be retrieved. ×: not supported; ✓:
fully supported; △: partially supported.
Chain
States
Internal
Transactions
Historical
States
Flexible
Interface
Ethereum full node ✓ × × ×
Ethereum archive node[22] ✓ × ✓ ×
Etherscan ✓ △ ✓ △
Ethereum in BigQuery[11] ✓ ✓ × ✓
Our system ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
will create a new account with this address. This means that the
SELFDESTRUCT opcode could implicitly create a new account.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
In the following, we will illustrate technical challenges and then
present the overall design of EthScope.
3.1 Technical Challenges
The basic idea of transaction-centric analysis is to first locate suspi-
cious transactions and then re-execute the transactions to detect
malicious smart contracts. Though the idea is straightforward, im-
plementing such a system faces several technical challenges.
Incomplete chain states and intermediate states. Our sys-
tem needs to provide an interface to look up suspicious transac-
tions. Though there exist many methods that could be leveraged to
explore normal transactions, few of them could be used for look up
internal ones. For instance, users could send RPC requests to the
Ethereum node to retrieve information about a normal transaction.
However, internal transactions are not available on Ethereum nodes
(both full and archive nodes.) Besides, historical states are crucial
to replay a transaction. That’s because they provide the execution
context at the time when the transaction was executed on the chain.
Moreover, our system should provide an efficient and flexible in-
terface to query a large number of transactions and historical states.
Unfortunately, no existing methods could satisfy our requirement.
For instance, the most popular service that allows users to explore
and search transactions is Etherscan [3]. But the network latency
and the limit on the number of transactions could be queried (Ether-
scan only shows the latest 100, 000 normal transactions for each
account) make it ineffective. Table 1 shows a comparison of states
that could be retrieved through each method.
Capability to replay arbitrary and a larger number of trans-
actions. After locating suspicious transactions, our system re-
executes them to detect malicious smart contracts. There exist two
different types of methods to replay transactions, both of which
suffer from the scalability issue.
The first one is to import the whole blockchain data with a cus-
tomized EVM, which will execute all transactions (normal and inter-
nal ones) from the genesis block (the first block on the chain). Rep-
resentative tools include ECFChecker [37], Sereum [46], AEGIS [36]
and SODA [31]. This method cannot selectively replay interested
transactions. Thus, many unrelated ones have been executed, con-
suming lots of time. For example, according to the official statis-
tics [25], a full block importing costs 6d8h7m with i3.2xlarge AWS
EC2 instances.
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Figure 2: The overall design of EthScope.
The second way is to use the debug.trace_transaction API
exposed by Geth, which allows users to replay a transaction with
the Ethereum archive node. Though this method is more efficient
than the previous one, it still suffers from the scalability issue.
That’s because the granularity of historical states maintained by the
Ethereum archive node is a block rather than a transaction. In order
to replay a transaction, all the (unnecessary) transactions before this
one inside the same block will be executed. Our system solves this
challenge with a transaction-level granularity of historical states.
Extensibility with customized analysis scripts to detect dif-
ferent attacks. Our system should be extensible to detect mul-
tiple attacks with analyst-provided scripts without changing the
underlying framework. Existing systems, e.g., ECFChecker, Sereum,
AEGIS and SODA, modify the EVM to perform detection when
importing the blockchain data. Due to the tight coupling between
these systems and the importing process of blockchain data, they
cannot be applied to selected transactions to detect attacks.
Geth has anmechanism called JSTracer [12] to introspect the exe-
cution of a smart contract. It allows users to specify a JavaScript file
that will be invoked for every opcode executed. However, frequent
switches between the EVM and the JavaScript file make it impracti-
cal to analyze a large number of transactions. Our system solves
this challenge with two optimizations. First, it has well-defined in-
strumentation points to minimize the number of context switches.
The analysis script will be invoked on-demand (instead of each
opcode) when defined instrumentation points are hit. Second, our
framework is equipped with a dynamic taint analysis engine inside
the EVM. Analysts do not need to implement their own taint engine
using JavaScript files, which further reduces the number of context
switches.
3.2 Overall Design
We solve the challenges with three components, i.e., Data Aggrega-
tor , Replay Engine, and Instrumentation Framework. Figure 2 shows
the overall system design.
Specifically, Data Aggregator imports the whole blockchain data
and collects chain states and intermediate states. In particular, chain
states could be directly retrieved by sending RPC requests to the
4
1 func ( s ∗ s t a t e O b j e c t ) s e t S t a t e ( key , value common . Hash ) {
2 s . d i r t y S t o r a g e [ key ] = value
3 // capture data
4 s . db . J ou rn a lCap t u r e . S e tCSS to r age ( s . address , key , value )
5 }
Figure 3: The code snippet to capture intermediate states
when executing the SSTORE opcode.
Ethereum node, while intermediate states are collected by mod-
ifying the EVM. Collected states are stored in a cluster database
equipped with a flexible query interface for further analysis. Note
that, the process to import the blockchain data is a one-time effort.
All the saves states could be queried and used without the need to
import the chain data again.
The second component, i.e, Replay Engine, is used to replay arbi-
trary transactions. In particular, an analyst first locates suspicious
transaction and feeds them the engine. The Replay Engine retrieves
transactions that need to be analyzed and then obtains the historical
states for each transaction. After that, it re-executes the transaction.
This process is paralleled according to the number of transactions
and number of CPU cores.
The third component, i.e., Instrumentation Framework, provides
a mechanism to customize the analysis. Specifically, an analyst can
write his or her own analysis scripts by defining callback functions
for instrumentation points. For instance, a specific callback function
could be defined and will be invoked if and only if the CALL opcode
is executed. By doing so, our system avoids unnecessary context
switches between EVM and the analysis script. During this process,
EVM states, including related stack andmemory values are provided
to the script. Moreover, to facilitate the development of analysis
scripts, a dynamic taint engine is provided by our system with
well-defined APIs.
4 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We have implemented a prototype system named EthScope. In par-
ticular, Data Aggregator is implemented with around 1, 137 lines
changes to the Geth client. Our system uses the distributed search
and analytics engine Elasticsearch [6] to store recovered blockchain
states and provide an interface to query transactions. The Replay
Engine and Instrumentation Framework are implemented with 5, 191
lines changes to the EVM. In the following sections, we will elabo-
rate the implementation details of each component.
4.1 Data Aggregator
In order to collect chain and intermediate states, we modified the
Ethereum client Geth. The collected data is stored into a database,
which provides a query interface for an analyst to locate suspicious
transactions.
States collection The process of chain states collection is straight-
forward. Our system changes the EVM to collect the data before the
execution of each block (block information) and after the execution
of each transaction (normal transactions).
Collecting intermediate states requires our system to hook into
the process of executing smart contracts. For instance, when the op-
code SSTORE is executed, the method setState in EVM is triggered.
We change this method and add the code to collect the captured
states. Figure 3 is a the code snippet in state_object.go. We added
a class called JournalCapture to capture intermediate states. Note
that, the states are not immediately stored into the underlying
database. Instead, we create a buffer and write the states into the
database when the buffer is full.
One issue is how to ensure the completeness and correctness
of collected states. In our system, we solve this issue by compar-
ing the collected states with ground truths. Specifically, for chain
states, we can easily compare them with the data stored inside the
Ethereum node. However, internal transactions are not available in
the Ethereum node. To this end, we compare our data with the data
provided by online services, i.e., Etherscan. Note that, this process
is continuously performed for newly collected states.
Data organization and query interface Our system leverages
the Elasticsearch [6] to store the collected states. Table 8 in Appen-
dix shows the detailed data schema.
Specifically, the Block index 2 stores the information about a
block and transactions inside the block. To quickly retrieve neces-
sary historical states when replying a transaction, we group them
into a nested field called Transaction. This transaction-level granu-
larity of historical states makes the replay of arbitrary transactions
efficient, since we do not need to execute unnecessary transactions
insides the same block to recover the states. Besides Block, we have
two extra indices State and Code to store the states about accounts
and the information of the process to create and destruct accounts.
Thanks to the Elasticsearch, an analyst could leverage the Query
DSL based on JSON to define queries [7] to locate suspicious trans-
actions.
4.2 Replay Engine
In order to monitor the behaviors of smart contracts and capture
the interactions between them, we build an engine that is capable of
replaying arbitrary transactions on blockchain. Our engine is based
on Geth, with modifications to prune unnecessary components
and add support to retrieve states from Data Aggregator . More-
over, it provides interfaces to communicate with Instrumentation
Framework, which we will discuss in Section 4.3.
Group transactions The input to Replay Engine is a list of hash
values for the suspicious transactions. In order to speed up the
process of obtaining related data from Data Aggregator , our system
divides transactions into different groups, with a threshold that each
group contains no more than 10, 000 transactions. This threshold
is related to the size of the system memory. During this process,
transactions belong to the same block are inside the same group.
After that, Replay Engine replays each transaction, which consists
of two steps, i.e., preparing historical states, and executing the
transaction.
Retrieve historical states In order to replay a transaction, we
need to retrieve historical states from Data Aggregator . First, we
need to get the block and transaction information such as Difficulty
and GasLimit from the Block index. Second, we need to retrieve
the code of smart contracts that are related to this transaction in
the nested field GetCodeList inside the field Transactions. That’s
because a normal transactions could initialize internal transactions
with multiple smart contracts. We need to retrieve the code for
2The index in Elasticsearch is similar to the database in a relational database.
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Table 2: Three types of instrumentation points supported in
our system. O: opcode-orientated; T: transaction-orientated;
C: context-orientated.
Instrumentation Points Type Description
{op}
after{Op} O
before and after the opcode {op}
is executed
transactionStart
transactionEnd T
before and after an external
transaction is executed
contractStart
contractEnd C
before and after a new contract
is executed
all the contracts. Third, we obtain all account states, e.g., nonce,
balance and storage values of accounts that the transaction will
read from the the nested field ReadCommittedState. Note that, the
retrieved data constructs a snapshot of blockchain states that the
transaction needs to be re-executed.
However, for some transactions, our system needs extra states.
One case is when a transaction is to create a new smart contract.
In this case, we need to retrieve the deploying code of the new
smart contract from the index Code. Table 8 in Appendix shows the
detailed information for the mentioned fields and indices.
Execute the transaction After retrieving historical states, Re-
play Engine executes the transaction. During this process, callback
functions defined in the analysis script will be invoked.
In order to speed up the process of executing transactions, our
system further divides transactions into different groups accord-
ing to the number of CPU cores, and executes transactions inside
different groups in parallel. This optimization can achieve a 10x
speed up (Table 7).
4.3 Instrumentation Framework
Instrumentation Framework aims to provide extensible APIs for an
analyst to develop scripts to detect attacks. Besides, Instrumentation
Framework provides a dynamic taint engine to facilitate the analysis.
Overview The framework is hooked into the Replay Engine and
provides JavaScript interfaces to interact with the Replay Engine.
Our system uses the Duktape JavaScript engine bindings for Go [8]
to execute JavaScript functions inside the EVM (developed using the
Go language.) Specifically, it defines instrumentation points, where
the replay will be suspended and user-defined callback functions
(in JavaScript) will be invoked. At the same time, it provides the in-
terfaces for analysis scripts to access the current execution context,
e.g., stack values, memory values. When the callback function ends,
the Replay Engine continues the execution of the smart contract
from the program counter after the instrumentation point.
Note that, user-defined callback functions can only observe the
execution context. They cannot make any changes to the stack and
memory values. Otherwise, the execution after the instrumentation
point could be broken, since important states of the EVM may have
been corrupted. However, our framework does support the explicit
change of a control flow through an API named cfg.hijack() (Ta-
ble 3). This is useful when we want to perform force-execution [44],
i.e., deliberately executing a program path.
contractStart
push, afterPush
return, afterReturn
contractEnd
C
O
O
C
transactionStart
contracStart
push, aftePush
call
T
C
O
O
afterCall
return, afterReturn
ContractEnd
transactionEnd
O
O
T
C
PUSH
CALL
RETURN
PUSH
RETURN
Internal Transaction
Contract A Contract B
EOA
Normal
Transaction
Figure 4: The sequence of invoking callback functions at
different types of instrumentation points. The code of the
smart contract is for illustration only. O: opcode-oriented; T:
transaction-oriented; C: contract-oriented.
Instrumentation points Our system supports three types of in-
strumentation points, i.e., opcode-, transaction- and contract-oriented
ones. Table 2 shows an overview of these instrumentation points.
First, the opcode-oriented instrumentation point links with two
callback functions for each opcode, {op} and after{Op}. They are
launched before and after executing the opcode {op}.
Second, transaction-oriented callbacks, transactionStart and
transactionEnd, are launched before and after a transaction is ex-
ecuted. These two instrumentation points are usually used for the
initialization and processing result in an analysis script. Note that,
this type of instrumentation points only works for normal trans-
actions, which are initialized from EOAs. For internal transactions
that are initialized from smart contracts, they are covered in the
contract-oriented instrumentation point.
Third, the contract-oriented callback functions, contractStart
and contractEnd, deal with function calls crossing smart contracts
(internal transactions.) These two functions are invoked at the start
and at the end of the execution of a smart contract function.
Figure 4 shows the sequence of invoking callback functions
at different instrumentation points. When an EOA issues a nor-
mal transaction, transactionStart will be invoked first, and then
contractStart is executed. That’s because the normal transaction
initializes the execution of smart contract A. Then the callback
functions for each opcode are launched, until the CALL opcode. This
opcode invokes the function inside the smart contract B and cre-
ates an internal transaction. Since the smart contract B is executed,
contractStartwill be invoked again. After that, callback functions
for different opcodes will be invoked accordingly.
Note that, the context is switched from the EVM to the Duk-
tape JavaScript engine to execute the analysis script, only when
the callback function is defined and the instrument point is hit at
runtime. This minimizes the number of context switches between
EVM and Duktape. Compared with the JSTracer inside the EVM,
our implementation is more efficient.
Execution contexts When a callback function is invoked, it can
observe the execution context through APIs provided by our system.
However, there exist multiple ways that an internal transaction
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Figure 5: Contexts of the SLOAD and SSTORE opcodes are differ-
ent when internal transactions are initialized through the
CALL and DELEGATECALL opcodes.
could be triggered, which makes the execution context more com-
plicated.
Specifically, there are six different opcodes that will trigger an
internal transaction to execute a new smart contract function,
including CALL, STATICCALL, CALLCODE, DELEGATECALL, CREATE and
CREATE2. When the EVM triggers an internal transaction, it will
construct a new execution context with the callee address. It also
sets two critical variables, i.e., self and CodeAddr to indicate con-
text contract and code contract 3, respectively. The CodeAddr is
always set to the address of the callee contract. However, when the
internal transaction is triggered through executing DELEGATECALL
and CALLCODE, EVM will set the self to the address of the caller
contract. Otherwise EVM will set the self to the callee address.
Accordingly, opcodes SLOAD and SSTORE interact with the storage
of the contract that self points to. Opcodes CODECOPY and CODESIZE
get information about the code of the contract that CodeAddr points
to. Figure 5 illustrates this process.
APIs to retrieve the execution context Our system provides
multiple APIs to get the information of current execution context.
Table 3 shows an overview of these APIs. We elaborate some of
them in the following.
• Normal transactions. Attributes of normal transactions are ob-
tained by invoking getBlockNumber, getTxnIndex and getTxnHash.
These attributes are used to distinguish different normal transac-
tions.
• Internal transactions. Two APIs contract.getSelfAddress and
contract.getCodeAddress are used to retrieve the context con-
tract and code contract. The API contract.getValue returns the
amount of Ether that is transferred into the code contract. Every
time an internal transaction starts, the EVM stack depth will
increase by one. On the contrary, every time an internal transac-
tion ends, it will decrease by one. The API getDepth is provided
to get current EVM stack depth. By using this information, we
can detect the occurrence of a recursive function call.
• Parameters and return values. The API contract.getInput re-
turns the input data (parameters) when invoking a function,
while getReturnData obtains return values of a function call.
3We follow the names used by Geth.
1 {
2 s l o a d : function ( l og ) {
3 c on t e x tCon t r a c t = toHex ( l og . c o n t r a c t . g e t S e l f A d d r e s s ( ) )
4 key = log . s t a c k . peek ( 0 ) . t o S t r i n g ( 1 6 )
5 t ag = c o n t r a c t +"_"+key
6 l o g . t a i n t . l a b e l S t a c k ( 0 , t ag )
7 } ,
8
9 jumpi : function ( l og ) {
10 t a g s = l og . t a i n t . peekS tack ( 1 )
11 f o r ( t ag in t a g s ) {
12 c on t e x tCon t r a c t = t ag . s u b s t r i n g ( 0 , t ag . indexOf ( "_" ) )
13 key = t ag . s u b s t r i n g ( t ag . indexOf ( "_" ) )
14 c on so l e . l og ( "Storage" , key , "in contract" ,
c on t e x tCon t r a c t , "influenced the control flow." )
15 }
16 }
17 }
Figure 6: An example of how to use the dynamic taint engine
to assign and check taint tags.
Our system do not provide APIs to access storage variables, since
only SLOAD and SSTORE can operate on storage variables. Analysts
can easily observe their values by defining callback functions of
these two opcodes.
• The program counter and remaining gas. APIs getPc and getGas
return the current program counter and remaining gas.
Dynamic taint engine Dynamic taint analysis has been widely
used for security applications. Our framework implements a dy-
namic taint engine that facilitates the development of analysis
scripts. In our implementation, the granularity of taint tags for
stack, storage is 32 bytes. That’s because the size of each entry in
stack and storage is 32 bytes. However, our system assign each taint
tag for each byte in the memory.
Our taint analysis engine supports the taint tag prorogation
crossing different smart contracts. When the EVM triggers an inter-
nal transaction, it will pass input values from the caller’s memory
to the callee’s input field. When the invocation returns, the return
values is put into the caller’s ret field. We propagate the taint tags
in opcodes CALLDATALOAD, CALLDATACOPY, RETURNDATACOPY that op-
erate on stack, memory, ret and input field.
Table 3 shows APIs to assign, clear and check taint tags. APIs
label* and clear* allow analysts to assign and clear tags. APIs
peek* allow analysts to check taint tags. Figure 6 shows an exam-
ple of how to use these APIs. Specifically, two callback functions
sload and jumpi are invoked before executing opcodes SLOAD and
JUMPI, respectively. Inside the callback function sload, it assigns
the taint tag to the value on the top of the stack (index 0) using
log.taint.labelStack(0, tag). Then the taint engine will propa-
gate the tag, even crossing different contracts. When the callback
function jumpi is executed, the log.taint.peekStack(1) checks
whether the second value on the stack (index 1) has the taint tag.
Note that, the JUMPI instruction checks the second value on the
stack and changes the program counter if the value is true. Thus,
by checking the taint tag, analysts can understand which storage
variables can influence the control flow.
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Table 3: APIs provided by our instrumentation framework.
APIs to retrieve execution context
op.getN() stack.length() memory.slice(start, end) contract.getSelfAddress() getBlockNumber() getPc()
op.toNumber() stack.peek(n) memory.getUint(offset) contract.getCodeAddress() getTxnIndex() getGas()
op.toString() contract.getValue() getTxnHash() getDepth()
contract.getInput() getReturnData()
Other APIs
cfg.hijack(isJump) params.get(key)
APIs to assign, clear and check taint tags
labelStack(n,tag) labelMemory(offset,size,tag) labelInput(o,s,t) labelReturnData(o,s,t) labelStorage(addr,slot,tag)
clearStack(n) clearMemory(offset,size) clearInput(o,s) clearReturnData(o,s) clearStorage(addr,slot)
peekStack(n) peekMemory(offset) peekInput(o) peekReturnData(o) peekStorage(addr,slot)
peekMemorySlice(offset,size) peekInputSlice(o,s) peekReturnDataSlice(o,s)
Table 4: The overall results of attacks detected by our sys-
tem. The evaluation is performed with the Data Aggregator
that has 9, 900, 000 blocks. The table shows the number of
suspicious transactions after querying the Data Aggregator
andmalicious transactions after verifying by the Replay En-
gine. We also show the number of victim accounts that have
been exploited and attackers’ accounts. (NOR: normal trans-
action. INT: internal transactions. EOA: externally owned
account. CON:contract account.)
# of Blocks # of Transactions # of Accounts
9.9M NOR 684, 664, 752 EOA: 88, 561, 717
INT: 852, 741, 697 CON: 24, 998, 114
Attacks # of SuspiciousTransactions
# of Malicious
Transactions
# of
Victims
# of
Attackers
Short address NOR: 240 EOA: 35 48
attack INT: 35 CON: 0 0
ERC20 Token NOR: 96, 223 EOA: 0 20, 866
AirDrop INT: 10, 147, 646 CON: 669 1, 024
DoS Attack I: NOR: 8, 986 3, 221 EOA: 22
EXTCODESIZE INT: 487, 643 125, 952 CON: 1
DoS Attack II: NOR: 38, 934 38, 840 EOA: 43
SUICIDE INT: 19, 165, 363 19, 154, 939 CON: 104
Integer NOR: 12, 299 505 EOA: 0 114
overflow INT: 472, 338 489 CON: 38 0
Reentrancy NOR: 20, 101 2, 952 EOA: 0 89
INT: 617, 371 434, 846 CON: 49 89
Bad NOR: 8, 466, 950 40, 414 EOA: 0 261
Randomness INT: 142, 042, 821 806, 317 CON: 102 227
5 EVALUATION
In the following, we will first evaluate the effectiveness of our
system by detecting multiple types of attacks, and then report the
system’s performance.
5.1 Overall Results
We have leveraged our system to detect six types attacks, including
the short address attack [20], abuse the AirDrop mechanism to
obtain bonus, DoS attacks using the EXTCODESIZE and SUICIDE op-
codes [32], integer overflow [14, 15, 17–19], the reentrancy attack
and bad randomness attack.
Table 4 shows the overall results of attacks detected by our sys-
tem.We report the number of suspicious transactions and malicious
ones after querying to the Data Aggregator and verifying by the
Replay Engine. We also show the number of victim accounts and
attacker’s accounts in the table. Due to the page limit, we will report
the detection result of two representative attacks, i.e., reentrancy
and bad randomness, in this paper.
5.2 Reentrancy Attack
Understand the attack The reentrancy attack is well-known on
Ethereum. For instance, attackers leveraged the reentrancy vulner-
ability to launch the attack towards the DAO smart contract and
stole 3.6 million Ether [48].
The root cause of the attack is developers do not have a full
understanding of the fallback function [24] used in the Solidity
language. In particular, a fallback function does not have any argu-
ments. It can be reached externally and does not return anything.
This function will be implicitly invoked in multiple cases, e.g., when
a contract receives Ether without any other data. As a result, the fall-
back function of a malicious smart contract could create a reentrant
call to vulnerable smart contracts. As a result, Ether will be trans-
ferred to attacker-controlled smart contracts before the remaining
balance is updated.
To detect the reentrancy attack, we need to first understand it
and then locate suspicious transactions. To this end, we leverage
a known malicious transaction that exploited the vulnerability
and constructed a dynamic call graph to illustrate the attack. In
particular, our Data Aggregator has the full information of internal
transactions. We traverse all the internal transactions triggered by
a known malicious normal transaction between smart contracts to
construct the call graph.
Figure 7 shows the dynamic call graph. In the graph, nodes
represent accounts, while edge are transactions. The serial numbers
of transaction are in the chronological order. The 0th transaction is
a normal transaction, and others are internal transactions triggered
by the normal transaction. For best illustration, we only use the
first 20 internal transactions to draw the graph. The actual number
of internal transactions triggered is 185.
By looking up this graph, we can find two distinct features of
transactions that launches the attack. First, there should exist a
loop in the graph. This is reasonable since the call to the fallback
function that further invokes the vulnerable contracts will create
a loop in the call graph. For instance, internal transactions 2, 7
and 8 create a loop that starts from and ends at the malicious
contract (0xc0ee9db). Second, there should exist a special smart
contract called reentry point, which is the smart contract that will
be invoked again before its previous invocation completes. For
instance, the DAO contract (0xbb9bc2) is a reentry point, since the
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Figure 7: The dynamic call graph of an normal transaction
that exploits the reentrancy vulnerability of the DAO smart
contract. We use four lines to describe an internal transac-
tion: 1. Serial number and the opcode to trigger an internal
transaction; 2. Transferred Ether, null means no Ether trans-
ferred; 3. Invoked function (we search the name from the
4byte function signature database [21]), null means that the
input data is empty; 4. EVM stack depth. (EOA: rectangle;
smart contract: ellipse. Attacker: gray; Victim: white.)
EVM stack depths of internal transactions (index 3 to 9) are all
bigger than internal transaction 2. That means before an invocation
to the DAO contract (0xbb9bc2) (internal transaction 2) returns,
another invocation (internal transaction 9) to the same contract
happens.
Locate suspicious transactions After understanding the attack,
we use the following two rules to lookup suspicious transactions
that may launch the reentrancy attack. In particular, we label a
normal transaction as a suspicious one, when
(1) Internal transactions triggered by this normal transaction create
a loop that contains at least one reentry point. This detects the
existences of reentrant function calls.
(2) There is at least one internal transaction that involves with the
Ether or ERC20 token transfer. This rule is to remove trans-
actions that do not cause any change to the Ether or REC20
tokens. They are not real attacks since no financial benefits are
achieved during this process.
Detect attacks We further replay suspicious transactions to de-
tect attacks. During this process, an analysis script is invoked (Fig-
ure 14 in Appendix). Inspired by the four reentrancy patterns sum-
marized in the Sereum paper [46], our system first constructs a set
of variables that could influence jump targets of the JUMPI opcode
or values of transferred Ether. Thanks to the dynamic taint engine
of our system, we can check whether a variable could influence
the control flow by checking the taint tag of the second top value
on the stack (taint.peekStack(1)). For each variable v in this set,
we define the callback function for the SSTORE opcode to monitor
1 function doWithdraw ( address from , address to , uint256 amount )
in terna l {
2 // only use in emergencies!
3 // you can only get a little at a time.
4 // we will hodl the rest for you.
5
6 require ( amount <= MAX_WITHDRAWAL) ;
7 require ( b a l a n c e s [ from ] >= amount ) ;
8 require ( wi thdrawalCount [ from ] < 3 ) ;
9
10 b a l a n c e s [ from ] = b a l a n c e s [ from ] . sub ( amount ) ;
11 // reentry point
12 t o . c a l l . value ( amount ) ( ) ;
13 withdrawalCount [ from ] = withdrawalCount [ from ] . add ( 1 ) ;
14 }
Figure 8: The code snippet of HODLWallet.
whether the variable has been updated after the reentrant point. If
so, we will label the normal transaction as malicious.
Detection result As shown in Table 4, our system located 20, 101
suspicious (normal) transactions. After replaying them, our system
detected 2, 952malicious normal transactions and 434, 846malicious
internal transactions, initialed from 89 EOAs and 89malicious smart
contracts. Attackers are targeting 49 victims, which are shown in
Table 10 in Appendix.
We manually analyzed each detected attack. During the analysis,
we only considers transactions that have caused financial loss as
true positives (real attacks). Our analysis shows that there are 3
false positives (marked with * in Table 10). We show the detailed
analysis of one false positive in the following.
Our system reported one attack targeting HODLWallet. Figure 8
shows the code snippet of the doWithdraw function. Specifically,
the variable withdrawalCount[from] in line 8 influences the con-
trol flow. Also this variable is updated after the reentry point in
line 13. Thus, our system detects this as a real reentrancy attack.
However, the transaction does not cause any financial loss since
the balance balances[from] has been updated in line 10 (before the
reentry point.) This is a false positive, though technically it is still a
reentrancy attack that targets withdrawalCount[from] instead of
balances[from].
Comparison with state-of-the-art tools There are multiple
systems that aim to detect the reentrancy vulnerability. Though the
main purpose of our system is to detect attacks, we can still compare
our result of victim contracts with that reported by other tools. In
this paper, we compare our result with two state-of-the-art tools,
Sereum [46] and SODA [31]. Since the result of SODA has covered
vulnerable contracts reported by Sereum, we will directly compare
our system with SODA. For a fair comparison, if not specified, we
only use the result before 8.18 million blocks, which is same with
SODA.
In particular, SODA reported 31 vulnerable contracts, with 5
false positives and 26 true positives. Among 5 false positives re-
ported by SODA, only 1 (HODLWallet) was also reported by our
system. This means our system has lower false positives than SODA.
For the 26 true positives reported by SODA, we detected 25 of
them. Our further analysis shows that the remaining one (address
is 0x59ABb8006B30D7357869760d21B4965475198d9D) is actually not
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1 function s e l l ( bytes32 hash , uint amount ) public {
2 . . . . . .
3 msg . sender . t ransfer ( t o t a l ) ;
4 // reentry point
5 ERC20 ( i n f o . token ) . t ransfer ( i n f o . owner , tradeAmount ) ;
6 i n f o . f i l l = i n f o . f i l l . add ( t o t a l ) ;
7 emit Trade ( hash , msg . sender , i n f o . token , tradeAmount , i n f o .
owner , t o t a l ) ;
8 }
Figure 9: The code snippet of DecentralizedExchanges.
Table 5: Vulnerable contracts detected by our system but
missed in SODA. The last column shows the number of
blocks when the contract was created.
Contract Address Name Birth Block
1. 0x3e64b1a66f3aa6f0765b093540481aa690c2b9b7 Anonymous 9, 269, 257
2. 0x857a8d8aa8d83562f9118405335bd4a1fb523317 I_bank 9, 264, 766
3. 0xfdb27beadad89f8282c51f5e5a4e77c1f19d7220 CB_Bank 9, 232, 237
4. 0x4b23577c0672ab1e436097b7daceadb75e5721c6 Pg_Bank 9, 141, 714
5. 0xffcf45b540e6c9f094ae656d2e34ad11cdfdb187 Uniswap 9, 059, 910
6. 0x4122073496955adb48e9a1dfaf6e456631b595a1 Anonymous 8, 986, 537
7. 0x2d5df43d54ae164a912db8de092cf707b446f693 CA_BANK 8, 986, 090
8. 0xb3e396f500df265cdfde30ec6e80dbf99bee9e96 pg_bank 8, 976, 703
9. 0x83a3a9b3068911b55a3989df0e642f487d08e424 CA_BANK 8, 943, 011
10. 0x6e3c384480e71792948c29e9fc8d7b9c9d75ae8f p_bank 8, 910, 477
11. 0x55791ea128a7b7fc871272d9147435a3abb3d1eb Anonymous 8, 783, 685
12. 0x7c6220c9537946a0861d7e86f6423af526f41375 Anonymous 8, 783, 636
13. 0xac629878277bf6a2fc46857eac4d4dd17bfa330f Anonymous 8, 783, 537
14. 0xf5cff81d51e81596519ecf61830cb084037a2218 Anonymous 8, 783, 364
15. 0xdd71e35f680bb5adc77c6d1d9ef5793598e613dc Piggy_BanK 8, 775, 620
16. 0x0eee3e3828a45f7601d5f54bf49bb01d1a9df5ea Lend.Me 8, 295, 432
17. 0x3ac969b43affc4e0684dc52dc3072b109d0e348d Bank 7, 251, 979
18. 0x8ce53575e1ce89131b370cbed602ce8cfa4f7805 Anonymous 6, 772, 010
19. 0x72f60eca0db6811274215694129661151f97982e Decentralized-Exchanges 6, 648, 350
20. 0xd4cd7c881f5ceece4917d856ce73f510d7d0769e Decentralized-Exchanges 6, 671, 456
vulnerable, and should not be reported. This means the SODA sys-
tem mis-classified this smart contract as a true positive.
There are 20 vulnerable contracts reported by our system but
are missed by SODA (Table 5). Among them, 16 were created after
8.18 million blocks. Attacks targeting smart contracts 17 and 18
happened after 8.18million blocks, though the contracts themselves
were created before that time. For the remaining two (19 and 20),
they are susceptible to the reentrancy vulnerability but are mis-
classified by SODA as false positives. Specifically, both of these two
contracts are called DecentralizedExchanges. The code snippet of
the contract is shown in Figure 9. In particular, the code in line 5 is
a reentry point. The variable info.fill is the one checked before
and updated after the reentry point.
5.3 Bad Randomness Attack
Understand the attack Smart contracts need to use pseudo-
random number in some cases. For instance, the popular game
Fomo3D [26] has a marketing mechanism to attract players. It ran-
domly sends bonus to game players, who have transferred Ether
to the game (buy the key). This marketing mechanism is called
AirDrop. In particular, it uses timestamp, difficulty, beneficiary ad-
dress and gas limit of current block and caller’s (player’s) account
address to determine whether the player could win the AirDrop
bonus.
However, sources to determine winners are predictable. Attack-
ers could use a smart contract to execute the same algorithm and
use same random number sources to predict whether itself could
win the bonus. If so, the contract will transfer a small number of
Ether to play the game and become the winner of the AirDrop
bonus [26].
Locate suspicious transactions We use the following query
to locate suspicious transactions. In particular, we find normal
transactions that have triggered more than one internal transaction
that transfers Ether. That’s because in order to launch the attack,
attackers have to use a contract to transfer Ether to play the game,
thus creating an internal transaction. Compared with the rules used
in previous attack, it is a general one and will find a large number of
transactions. This is intentional since we want to include as many
suspicious transactions as possible in this step, and leverage the
replay engine to confirm the attack.
Detect attacks The key observation of this attack is that the
attacking contract is running a same algorithm using same random
number sources with the victim contract. The detection script is
shown in Figure 15 in Appendix.
(1) First, we find all the variables that are generated from block in-
formation, e.g., coinbase, gaslimit and etc. This is implemented
using our taint analysis engine by setting the block information
as taint sources.
(2) Second, for each variable v found in the previous step, we check
whether it influences the control flow of the smart contract.
That’s because we only care the variables that can determine
the winner. If so, we log its execution context C.
(3) If there exist two same execution contexts in different internal
transactions that are triggered by a same normal transaction,
then the normal transaction is a malicious one that launches
the attack. That’s because two smart contracts are executing a
same algorithm from same random number sources to generate
a variable that can influence the control flow to determine the
winner.
Detection result We replayed 8, 466, 950 normal transactions
with our analysis script. After that, 40, 414 normal transactions are
labeled as malicious ones. During this process, 227 malicious smart
contracts are detected. We then group these malicious contracts
based on their creators, i.e., EOAs that create these contracts. In
total, we get 79 groups that are shown in Table 11 in Appendix. We
manually checked the malicious smart contracts created in each
group and found that 74 of them are true positives. In total, they
have initialized 40, 358 normal transactions to attack 95 victim smart
contracts (after removing false positives.) Table 12 in Appendix
shows the detailed information of victim contracts.
Case study: Fomo3D To fully understand the attack to Fomo3D,
we performed a detailed analysis using our system. Our first step
is to construct the money flow graph. The intuition behind this
is that the money will eventually flow into (successful) attackers.
Figure 10 shows the money flow graph constructed using trans-
actions retrieved from the Data Aggregator . Specifically, nodes in
the graph represent accounts, and edges represent the direct and
indirect transactions with the Fomo3D game. The size of each node
denotes the number of Ether it receives.
Several accounts in the figure have a much larger size than
others. These accounts have received much more Ether from the
game than others. An initial analysis shows that three of them
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Figure 10: The money flow graph of the Fomo3D smart con-
tract. For better illustration, we use 180, 244 transactions to
generate this graph. The total number of transactions with
the Fomo3D smart contract is much larger.
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Figure 11: The dynamic call graph of a transaction from
contract 0x94c0d029a7b64bf443e89c5006089364c0d60d61, a ma-
licious contract that is attacking the Fomo3D game to get the
Airdrop rewards.
belong to Fomo3D (number 0, 1 and 6). We then take a further
analysis on other accounts.
Specifically, we analyzed transactions from the smart contract
0x94c0d029a7b64bf443e89c5006089364c0d60d61 to understandwhy
the Ether in this smart contract accumulates. To this end, we first
find an internal transaction initiated from this smart contract, which
eventually receives Ether from the Fomo3D game. Then we con-
struct the dynamic call graph (Figure 11). The call sequence of this
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Figure 12: The flow of the bad randomness attack.
graph shows that, the contract (0x94c0d029a) transfers 0.1 Ether to
0xbe997116 (index 4), which further creates a new smart contract
0x73542fcd (index 6). This contract buys the key (index 9) with 0.1
Ether and then received 0.126 Ether (index 17) from the game. The
received Ether is transferred to 0x94c0d029a with a SELFDESTRUCT
operation (index 18). During this process, it obtains a profit of
0.26 Ether. We queried the Data Aggregator for similar transactions
from this smart contract. There are 1, 332 transaction, which earned
250.8225 Ether in total.
Our next analysis intends to understand why the Fomo3D game
sends 0.126 Ether to the malicious smart contract previously dis-
cussed. Since the transfer occurs after the invocation of buyXid
(index 9), we manually analyzed its source code. The function even-
tually invokes the core function. This function increases the bal-
ance (plyr_[pID].win) of a player, if the return value of the call
to airdrop function is true. The airdrop function calculates a ran-
dom seed based on the information of the block, e.g., timestamp,
difficulty, and the address of the caller smart contract (0x73542fcd,
index 9). After that, it will compare the seed with another variable
to determine the return value as true or false. According to the
source code, this is a mechanism called AirDrop to randomly send
bonus to players, if the return result of the airdrop function is true
(code snippet is shown in Figure 13 in Appendix.).
Surprisingly, the contract 0x73542fcd is created by 0xbe997116,
and its only transaction is to buy the key and get the bonus. We
suspect that attackers have a mechanism to predict whether it
can win the bonus before buying the key. Since the random seed
depends on block information (which are fixed values for a block)
and the address of the caller smart contract. If attackers can control
an address of a smart contract, then they can predict the result of
whether winning the bonus.
Accordingly to Section 2.1, the address of a newly created smart
contract is calculated using the address of its creator and nonce,
thus the attacker could predict the address of the smart contract it
is going to create, and predict whether it will win the bonus.
Figure 12 shows the attack flow. There is a controller contract,
which creates a lot of proxy contracts (more than 1, 000). Then
during the attack, the controller attack loops through each proxy
contract. It calculates the address of a newly created smart contract
if it is created by the proxy contract (but does not actually create
it.) Then it uses this address and the block information to predict
whether it will get the bonus by executing a same logic with the
airdrop) function in the Fomo3D contract. If so, the proxy smart
contract creates the attacking contract, which further buys the
key to play the game and win the bonus. After that, the attacking
contract self-destructs itself to transfer the earned bonus to the
controller smart contract.
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Table 6: The comparison of JSTracer and our system to re-
play 100 normal transactions.
Tools RetrieveSnapshot
Execute
Script Other
JSTracer 39m6s997ms 0m16s984ms 8m13s467msTotal 47m37s448ms
Our system 0m0s446ms 0m0s217ms 0m0s544msTotal 0m1s207ms
5.4 Performance
In this section, we report the performance of our system. All the
experiments were performed on a machine with four CPUs (Intel(R)
Xeon(R) Silver 4110 CPU @ 2.10GHz) and 128G memory.
Data Aggregator The purpose of Data Aggregator is to quickly
locate suspicious transactions. In our experiment, our system takes
around 3 minutes to retrieve normal transactions used for the the
reentrancy (20, 101) and the bad randomness attack (8, 466, 950)
from 686, 664, 752 normal transactions.
Replay Engine and Instrumentation Framework In the fol-
lowing, we will compare the performance of JSTracer supported by
Geth and our system.
First, we randomly pick 100 normal transactions that triggered
internal transactions. Then, we develop an analysis script that has
a same functionality with the example [9] (4byte_tracer.js) provided
by Geth. Finally, we use the JSTracer and our system to replay
100 normal transactions. Note that, a normal transaction could
trigger multiple internal transaction. The total number of normal
and internal transactions replayed is 2, 519.
Table 6 shows the result. Our system takes only around 1 seconds
to replay the transactions, while JSTracer usesmore than 47minutes
(around 2, 300x speed up). We further explore the reasons.
• Granularity of historical states In order to retrieve snap-
shot of the 100 normal transactions, JSTracer replayed 3, 289
additional normal transactions. However, EthScope can retrieve
snapshot directly by querying fine-grained states from Data Ag-
gregator .
• Number of context switches JSTracer needs to switch to
the JavaScript environment for each opcode. However, our In-
strumentation Framework only performs context-switch when
instrumentation points are hit. Therefore, EthScope performed
2, 502 context switches, while JSTracer performed 1, 305, 864
switches.
This results shows that our system successfully solves the scal-
ability challenges and can replay a larger number of transactions.
In fact, for the 8, 466, 950 normal transactions used to detect the
bad randomness attack, our system takes 10h44m9s616ms to replay
them. Without the optimization, it’s nearly impossible to replay
such as large number of transaction in JSTracer.
Our system parallelizes the replay process according to the num-
ber of transactions and CPU cores. We report the performance
improvement due to this optimization in Table 7. During the ex-
periment, we use two groups of 1, 000 normal transactions. The
first group contains normal transactions. For each one, it will trig-
ger more than 20 internal transactions. This is for the scenario of
multiple interactions between contracts. The second group contain
the transactions that only trigger one internal transaction. This
Table 7: Performance gain of usingmultithreading. Group 1:
1000 normal transactions that will triggermore than 20 inter-
nal transactions; Group 2: 1000 simple normal transactions
that will trigger only one internal transaction.
Group 1 Group 2
Single thread 1m42s358ms 0m14s802ms
Multithreading 0m12s458ms 0m1s570ms
represents a simple function invocation. The result shows that by
using multithreading, our system can have a speedup of around
10x .
6 DISCUSSION
False negatives The purpose of our system is to detect mali-
cious smart contracts and understand their behaviors. Analysts
use Data Aggregator to quickly locate suspicious transactions, and
then use the latter two components to confirm malicious behaviors
at runtime. Compared with other static analysis tools, our system
may have false negatives, which means it may miss some mali-
cious smart contracts. However, it usually has low false positives.
During the evaluation, we do find that it can locate some attacks
that are missed in previous research. For instance, our system suc-
cessfully detected real attacks to two vulnerable smart contracts
(0x72f60eca0db6811274215694129661151f97982e and another one
0xd4cd7c881f5ceece4917d856ce73f510d7d0769e) that were previ-
ously unknown. Nevertheless, we can combine other static analysis
tools. For instance, our system could replay transactions of the
vulnerable smart contracts reported by other systems [30, 35, 39–
41, 43, 45, 49–51] to locate real attacks.
Usability Though we have demonstrated the effectiveness of our
system, an analyst still needs the domain knowledge to first locate
suspicious transactions. One potential direction is to use new tech-
niques, e.g., machine learning algorithms to automatically locate
suspicious ones. Currently, our system provides a dynamic taint
engine to facilitate the analysis. In the future, we can integrate more
components, e.g., dynamic symbolic execution, into the system to
ease the development of analysis scripts.
7 RELATEDWORK
Data analysis frameworks of Ethereum The proposed graph
analysis method [34] collects Ethereum states and then performs
money flow analysis, account creation analysis and contract invo-
cation analysis. DataEther [33] first instruments an Ethereum full
node to collect data and then uses ElasticSearch [6] to store the
collected data. Similar with our system, they can be used to locate
suspicious transactions. However, they do not have the capability
to introspect the execution of smart contracts to detect attacks.
Static analysis tools of smart contracts Recent studies have
focused on vulnerability detection, includingOyente [41],Mythril [13],
Osiris [50], MAIAN [43], ContractFuzzer [39], ILF Fuzzer [38], Se-
curify [51] and ZEUS [40]. These systems only provide a static view
of smart contract code, i.e., whether they are vulnerable or not.
They cannot provide a dynamic view of contract interactions (or
transactions). This limitation motivates the development of our
system. Note that, our approach does not intend to replace them,
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but complements them to provide capabilities to detect malicious
smart contracts. In fact, their outputs could provide hints to locate
suspicious transactions, e.g., transactions interact with vulnerable
contracts reported by these systems.
Dynamic analysis tools of smart contracts Dynamic analysis
has been regarded as an effective complement to the static analysis
for security purposes. ECFChecker [37], Sereum [46] and SODA [31]
are representative ones. Both Sereum [46] and ECFChecker [37]
focus on the detection of the reentrancy attack. Our system is an ex-
tensible framework that could be leveraged to detect multiple types
of attacks. SODA [31] can detect 8 inappropriate behaviors. How-
ever, it is tightly coupled with the importing process of blockchain
data, and cannot be used to analyze selected transactions to detect
attacks.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design and implement a transaction-centric secu-
rity analytics framework for malicious smart contracts detection. It
provides an efficient way to locate suspicious transactions and an
extensible way to detect malicious contracts with analyst-provided
scripts. We solved multiple technical challenges to build such a
framework. The evaluation result shows the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of our system.
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Table 8: ElasticSearch Indices
Index Name Field Field ofNested Field
Field of
Nested Field of
Nested Field
Field of
Nested Field of
Nested Field of
Nested Field
Block
DifficultyR
ExtraData
GasLimitR
GasUsed
HashR
MinerR
NumberR
TimestampR
TxnCount
Transaction
CallFunctionR
ConAddress
CumGasUsed
FromAddressR
GasLimitR
GasPriceR
GasUsedR
GetCodeListR
HashR
IntTxnCount
NonceR
Status
ToAddressR
TxnIndex
ValueR
InternalTxns
CallFunction
CallParameter
ConAddress
EvmDepth
FromAddress
GasLimit
Output
ToAddress
TxnIndex
Type
Value
Logs
Address
Topics
Data
ReadCommittedStateR
Address
Balance
CodeHash
CodeSize
Nonce
Storage Key
Value
ChangedState
Address
Balance
Nonce
Storage Key
Value
15
Index Name Field Field ofNested Field
Field of
Nested Field of
Nested Field
Field of
Nested Field of
Nested Field of
Nested Field
Code
Number
Timestamp
Transaction
Hash
TxnIndex
InputR
ContractR
Address
Hash
Code
State
Number
Timestamp
Transaction
Hash
TxnIndex
Create
Reset
SuicideR
R : fields that are necessary for replaying transactions.
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1 function buyXid ( uint256 _af fCode , uint256 _team )
2 {
3 . . .
4 // buy core
5 buyCore ( _pID , _a f fCode , _team , _eventData_ ) ;
6 }
7
8 function buyCore ( uint256 _pID , uint256 _a f f ID , uint256 _team , F 3Dda t a s e t s . Even tRe tu rns memory _eventData_ )
9 {
10 . . .
11 // if round is active
12 i f ( _now > round_ [ _r ID ] . s t r t + rndGap_ && ( _now <= round_ [ _r ID ] . end | | ( _now > round_ [ _r ID ] . end && round_ [ _r ID ] . p l y r == 0 )
) )
13 {
14 // call core
15 co re ( _rID , _pID , msg . value , _ a f f ID , _team , _eventData_ ) ;
16
17 // if round is not active
18 } e l se {
19 . . .
20 }
21 }
22
23 function co re ( . . . )
24 {
25 i f ( a i r d r o p ( ) == true )
26 {
27 uint256 _ p r i z e ;
28 i f ( _e th >= 10000000000000000000 )
29 {
30 // calculate prize and give it to winner
31 _ p r i z e = ( ( a i rDropPo t_ ) . mul ( 7 5 ) ) / 1 0 0 ;
32 p l y r _ [ _pID ] . win = ( p l y r _ [ _pID ] . win ) . add ( _ p r i z e ) ;
33 } e l se
34 {
35 . . .
36 }
37 }
38 }
39
40 function a i r d r o p ( )
41 {
42 uint256 seed = uint256 ( keccak256 ( a b i . encodePacked (
43 ( block . timestamp ) . add
44 ( block . d i f f i c u l t y ) . add
45 ( ( uint256 ( keccak256 ( a b i . encodePacked ( block . coinbase ) ) ) ) / (now ) ) . add
46 ( block . gas l imit ) . add
47 ( ( uint256 ( keccak256 ( a b i . encodePacked (msg . sender ) ) ) ) / (now ) ) . add
48 ( block . number )
49
50 ) ) ) ;
51 i f ( ( s eed − ( ( s eed / 1 0 0 0 ) ∗ 1 0 0 0 ) ) < a i rDropTra cke r_ )
52 return ( true ) ;
53 e l se
54 return ( f a l s e ) ;
55 }
Figure 13: Code snippet of the Fomo3D smart contract.
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1 {
2 transactionStart: function(log) {
3 this.tagToCodeSequence = {}
4 this.invocationID = -1
5 this.currentInvocation = []
6 },
7
8 callStart: function(log) {
9 this.invocationID ++
10 this.currentInvocation.push(this.invocationID)
11 callIdentifier = {}
12 callIdentifier["Type"] = "CallStart"
13 callIdentifier["EvmDepth"] = log.getDepth ()
14 callIdentifier["DirectCallee"] = toHex(log.contract.getCodeAddress ())
15 callIdentifier["DirectCaller"] = toHex(log.contract.getDirectCaller ())
16 callIdentifier["InvocationID"] = this.currentInvocation[this.currentInvocation.length -1]
17 for (tag in this.tagToCodeSequence) {
18 this.tagToCodeSequence[tag].push(callIdentifier)
19 }
20 },
21
22 callEnd: function(log) {
23 this.currentInvocation.pop()
24 },
25
26 afterSha3: function(log) {
27 log.taint.labelStack (0, "SHA3")
28 },
29
30 sload: function(log) {
31 taints = log.taint.peekStack (0)
32 taintsLen = taints.length
33 if (taintsLen == 0) {
34 return
35 }
36 for (i = 0; i < taintsLen; i++) {
37 if (taints[i] == "SHA3") {
38 key = log.stack.peek (0).toString (16)
39 contextContract = toHex(log.contract.getSelfAddress ())
40 tag = contextContract+"_"+key
41 log.taint.clearStack (0)
42 log.taint.labelStack (0, tag)
43 break
44 }
45 }
46 },
47
48 call: function(log) {
49 taints = log.taint.peekStack (2)
50 taintsLen = taints.length
51 if (taintsLen == 0) {
52 return
53 }
54 value = log.stack.peek (2).valueOf ()
55 if (value == 0) {
56 return
57 }
58 ethTransferIdentifier = {}
59 ethTransferIdentifier["Type"] = "ETHTransfer"
60 ethTransferIdentifier["EvmDepth"] = log.getDepth ()
61 ethTransferIdentifier["InvocationID"] = this.currentInvocation[this.currentInvocation.length -1]
62 ethTransferIdentifier["DirectCallee"] = toHex(log.contract.getCodeAddress ())
63 ethTransferIdentifier["DirectCaller"] = toHex(log.contract.getDirectCaller ())
64 for (i = 0; i < taintsLen; i++) {
65 tag = taints[i]
66 if (!(tag in this.tagToCodeSequence)) {
67 this.tagToCodeSequence[tag] = []
68 }
69 this.tagToCodeSequence[tag].push(ethTransferIdentifier)
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70 }
71 },
72 callcode: function(log) {
73 this.call(log)
74 },
75 create: function(log) {
76 this.call(log)
77 },
78 create2: function(log) {
79 this.call(log)
80 },
81
82 jumpi: function(log) {
83 taints = log.taint.peekStack (1)
84 taintsLen = taints.length
85 if (taintsLen == 0) {
86 return
87 }
88 condIdentifier = {}
89 condIdentifier["Type"] = "Cond"
90 condIdentifier["EvmDepth"] = log.getDepth ()
91 condIdentifier["InvocationID"] = this.currentInvocation[this.currentInvocation.length -1]
92 condIdentifier["DirectCallee"] = toHex(log.contract.getCodeAddress ())
93 condIdentifier["DirectCaller"] = toHex(log.contract.getDirectCaller ())
94 for (i = 0; i < taintsLen; i++) {
95 tag = taints[i]
96 if (!(tag in this.tagToCodeSequence)) {
97 this.tagToCodeSequence[tag] = []
98 }
99 this.tagToCodeSequence[tag].push(condIdentifier)
100 }
101 },
102
103 sstore: function(log) {
104 key = log.stack.peek (0).toString (16)
105 contextContract = toHex(log.contract.getSelfAddress ())
106 tag = contextContract+"_"+key
107 resetIdentifier = {}
108 resetIdentifier["Type"] = "Reset"
109 resetIdentifier["EvmDepth"] = log.getDepth ()
110 resetIdentifier["InvocationID"] = this.currentInvocation[this.currentInvocation.length -1]
111 resetIdentifier["DirectCallee"] = toHex(log.contract.getCodeAddress ())
112 resetIdentifier["DirectCaller"] = toHex(log.contract.getDirectCaller ())
113 if (tag in this.tagToCodeSequence) {
114 this.tagToCodeSequence[tag].push(resetIdentifier)
115 }
116 },
117
118 transactionEnd: function(log) {
119 for (tag in this.tagToCodeSequence) {
120 codeSequence = this.tagToCodeSequence[tag]
121 length = codeSequence.length
122 for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
123 startCode = codeSequence[i]
124 if (startCode["Type"] == "Cond") {
125 startDepth = startCode["EvmDepth"]
126 startCallee = startCode["DirectCallee"]
127 startCaller = startCode["DirectCaller"]
128 reenterInvocationIDs = {}
129 condInRee = false
130 resetInRee = false
131 for (j = i+1; j < length; j++) {
132 code = codeSequence[j]
133 if (code["Type"] == "CallStart") {
134 if (code["EvmDepth"] <= startDepth) {
135 break
136 }
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137 if (code["DirectCallee"] == startCallee && code["DirectCaller"] == startCaller)
{
138 reenterInvocationIDs[code["InvocationID"]] = true
139 }
140 } else if (code["Type"] == "Cond" && code["InvocationID"] in reenterInvocationIDs) {
141 condInRee = true
142 } else if (code["Type"] == "Reset" && code["InvocationID"] in reenterInvocationIDs)
{
143 resetInRee = true
144 } else if (code["Type"] == "Reset" && condInRee && resetInRee) {
145 if (code["DirectCallee"] == startCallee && code["InvocationID"] == startCode["
InvocationID"]) {
146 return toHex(log.getTxnHash ())
147 } else if (code["DirectCallee"] != startCallee && code["Invocation"] > startCode
["InvocationID"]) {
148 return toHex(log.getTxnHash ())
149 }
150 }
151 }
152 } else if (startCode["Type"] == "ETHTransfer") {
153 startDepth = startCode["EvmDepth"]
154 startCallee = startCode["DirectCallee"]
155 startCaller = startCode["DirectCaller"]
156 reenterInvocationIDs = {}
157 isReenter = false
158 for (j = i+1; j < length; j++) {
159 code = codeSequence[j]
160 if (code["Type"] == "CallStart") {
161 if (code["EvmDepth"] <= startDepth) {
162 break
163 }
164 if (code["DirectCallee"] == startCallee && code["DirectCaller"] == startCaller)
{
165 reenterInvocationIDs[code["InvocationID"]] = true
166 }
167 } else if (code["Type"] == "ETHTransfer" && code["InvocationID"] in
reenterInvocationIDs) {
168 isReenter = true
169 } else if (code["Type"] == "Reset" && isReenter) {
170 if (code["DirectCallee"] == startCallee && code["InvocationID"] == startCode["
InvocationID"]) {
171 return toHex(log.getTxnHash ())
172 } else if (code["DirectCallee"] != startCallee && code["InvocationID"] >
startCode["InvocationID"]) {
173 return toHex(log.getTxnHash ())
174 }
175 }
176 }
177 }
178 }
179 }
180 }
181 }
Figure 14: The script to detect reentrancy attacks
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1 {
2 transactionStart: function(log) {
3 this.contracts = {}
4 },
5
6 callStart: function(log) {
7 input = log.contract.getInput ()
8 inputLength = input.length
9 log.taint.clearInput (0, inputLength)
10 },
11
12 // pseudo random number source
13 afterBlockhash: function(log) {
14 log.taint.labelStack (0, "blockhash")
15 },
16
17 afterCoinbase: function(log) {
18 log.taint.labelStack (0, "coinbase")
19 },
20
21 afterTimestamp: function(log) {
22 log.taint.labelStack (0, "timestamp")
23 },
24
25 afterNumber: function(log) {
26 log.taint.labelStack (0, "number")
27 },
28
29 afterDifficulty: function(log) {
30 log.taint.labelStack (0, "difficulty")
31 },
32
33 afterGaslimit: function(log) {
34 log.taint.labelStack (0, "gaslimit")
35 },
36
37 // Comparison operations
38 lt: function(log) {
39 taints0 = log.taint.peekStack (0)
40 taints0Len = taints0.length
41 taints1 = log.taint.peekStack (1)
42 taints1Len = taints1.length
43 if (taints0Len < 2 && taints1Len < 2) {
44 return
45 }
46 taints = taints0
47 value = log.stack.peek (0).toString (16)
48 taintsLen = taints0Len
49 if (taints0Len < 2) {
50 taints = taints1
51 taintsLen = taints1Len
52 value = log.stack.peek (1).toString (16)
53 }
54 tag = "randomness"
55 for (i = 0; i < taintsLen; i++) {
56 tag += "_"+taints[i]
57 }
58 tag += "_"+value
59 log.taint.clearStack (0)
60 log.taint.clearStack (1)
61 log.taint.labelStack (0, tag)
62 },
63 gt: function(log) {
64 this.lt(log)
65 },
66
67 slt: function(log) {
68 this.lt(log)
69 },
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70 sgt: function(log) {
71 this.lt(log)
72 },
73
74 eq: function(log) {
75 this.lt(log)
76 },
77
78 // Control decision
79 jumpi: function(log) {
80 taints = log.taint.peekStack (1)
81 taintsLen = taints.length
82 if (taintsLen == 0) {
83 return
84 }
85 codeContract = toHex(log.contract.getCodeAddress ())
86 pc = log.getPc().toString ()
87 for (i = 0; i < taintsLen; i++) {
88 tag = taints[i]
89 if (tag.indexOf("randomness_") != -1) {
90 lastIdx = tag.lastIndexOf("_")
91 randomNumber = tag.substring(lastIdx +1)
92 randomSources = {}
93 j = 0
94 nextIdx = tag.indexOf("_", j)
95 while(nextIdx != lastIdx) {
96 endIdx = tag.indexOf("_", j+1)
97 randomSources[tag.substring(nextIdx+1, endIdx)] = true
98 j++
99 nextIdx = tag.indexOf("_", j)
100 }
101 this.contracts[codeContract] = {}
102 this.contracts[codeContract ][pc] = {"RandomNumber": randomNumber , "RandomSources":
randomSources}
103 }
104 }
105 },
106
107 transactionEnd: function(log) {
108 flag = false
109 for (contracta in this.contracts) {
110 for (pca in this.contracts[contracta ]) {
111 randomnessa = this.contracts[contracta ][pca]
112 for (contractb in this.contracts) {
113 if (contracta == contractb) {
114 continue
115 }
116 for (pcb in this.contracts[contractb ]) {
117 randomnessb = this.contracts[contractb ][pcb]
118 if (randomnessa["RandomNumber"] == randomnessb["RandomNumber"] && this.
compareSources(randomnessa["RandomSources"], randomnessb["RandomSources"])) {
119 flag = true
120 }
121 }
122 }
123 }
124 }
125 contracts = []
126 for (contract in this.contracts) {
127 contracts.push(contract)
128 }
129 if (flag) {
130 return {"Hash": toHex(log.getTxnHash ()), "Contracts": contracts}
131 }
132 },
133
134 compareSources: function(source1Dict , source2Dict) {
135 for (source in source1Dict) {
136 if (!( source in source2Dict)) {
137 return false
138 }
139 }
140 return true
141 }
142 }
Figure 15: The script to detect the bad randomness attack
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Table 9: Groups of attackers that are exploiting the reentrancy vulnerability. * represents false positives.
Creator # EntranceContracts # Attacks
# Reentry
Points
1. 0xa568641f3032c3d2fd83d69215c9ad5971a4cd55 1 1063 1
2. 0x60f3fdb85b2f7faaa888ca7afc382c57f6415a81 1 525 2
3. 0x79f09717c5b352078234832e5737651ddb333548 4 297 1
4. 0x969837498944ae1dc0dcac2d0c65634c88729b2d 2 245 1
5. 0xf35e2cc8e6523d683ed44870f5b7cc785051a77d 2 245 1
6. 0xbe3ae5cb97c253dda67181c6e34e43f5c275e08b 4 175 2
7. 0x1dba1131000664b884a1ba238464159892252d3a 3 137 1
8. 0x15def77337168d707e47e68ab9f7f6c17126b562 1 42 1
9. 0x53eefe54c5a21bc6495f9e5d1b1d5c4e648ab612 1 41 1
10. 0xa9bf70a420d364e923c74448d9d817d3f2a77822 1 29 1
11. 0x06b671106bf4de59243111c0fece9f43da91595f 2 25 1
12. 0xac80cba14c08f8a1242ebd0fd45881cfee54b0a2 1 25 1
13. 0x42dd879f8eb7e9b43036a5b4c97b02c6176d6b99 6 9 1
14. 0x20b01a7624c44f37078de96dcc8d5fc4aded7321 2 8 1
15. 0xfc4746b3f38f029737608315d63d17f7e867ed35 2 7 1
16. 0xcf267ea3f1ebae3c29fea0a3253f94f3122c2199 2 7 1
17. 0xd9ded446ce2076eb24ad24477da7ea4a1d0f129a 3 5 5
18. 0xe6002189a74b43e6868b20c1311bc108e38aac57 1 5 1
19. 0x003cefc1b679b780caea9ff58f9287ad59d83b00 2 5 1
20. 0xef0fde3af93aa69364b9b83ea7d13b43793474da 4 4 4
21. 0x4fae38ced4c4b1360d0535108bb1cbc376cb37a6 3 3 2
22. 0x827806ff62a98ecae9778f316ffd85fd94276d0d 3 3 3
23. 0xa70d9810eda6e14810593270a8d57e3965bf890e 1 3 1
24. 0x5e2073e67dc5e1132d2eb45affdd7944614c7959 1 3 3
25. 0x00ecc4224b897ef5d43b43b83c0dc9a4a8c38c53* 1 2 2
26. 0xbc936aee249651aa6f93ccb09244600d50eb1d77 1 2 1
27. 0x6b35c9f9670c0641e3d5e80642992223d1ffec7b 1 2 2
28. 0x0fb928e2939833ac5baba628df4a295c39f4e583 1 2 1
29. 0xe500732effa4922a97671cd310c613ba88c32315 1 2 1
30. 0x7bf9a7eeccf2d1de1833b20b6ce9bdddcef58722 2 2 2
31. 0x62781f11b58e2caf8f28eaebc73fe711c634dcff* 1 1 1
32. 0x13c7c27ea7ee89ec6607965b6f357b0109bc98b4 1 1 1
33. 0x2b122ead009e73de6d76eae0bcc5d9cc52e67f08 1 1 1
34. 0x7da2da424c133b1786fe55e5ec507dd8250ebaa1 1 1 1
35. 0xf96d92dcf5449936732a56e083c3f8168ff3931c 1 1 1
36. 0x44aaccc12b62a7037072b85934d5cc9d91fe8921 1 1 1
37. 0x20c945800de43394f70d789874a4dac9cfa57451 1 1 1
38. 0x4d9f0ce2893f2f1bc0a0f0ba60aee3176c9f5f91 1 1 1
39. 0xbc61043bc52195b124906cc57bf74fe12f530634 1 1 1
40. 0x60534599e4b2148425effaca9d059eccadafb235 1 1 1
41. 0xf7f0cd609e58437693c4f41075b30d8caf543acc 1 1 1
42. 0x38a9f04fc6a7619cf8daf34d9cc709d17be8023a 1 1 1
43. 0x110cffcd772c73c7b9c2e00e6c9b5fdede85dcc0 1 1 1
44. 0x3e8d62fd679ece9f0a20a66e4105891d26fa92ca 1 1 1
45. 0x100c3ecf14aa1354598ce7bec42909b6e9e97243 1 1 1
46. 0xef38208167b81c817624653527dcd7e476346568 1 1 1
47. 0x8cfee63a79a0d1fb97241ee91d39922491b6f449 1 1 1
48. 0xb96d122b5d031012db46f6120a6c6609d50acc04 1 1 1
49. 0xde7e47b63d49a2ff2a209807b1d57513a9968a5b 1 1 1
50. 0x83c72b3039a8ded0ce019ea42a9c835f7c3c645b 1 1 1
51. 0x66425a8b84205f891717383fd828e633484deab5 1 1 1
52. 0x91e4ff13ba4d5e276407a2be0f267c0ae6bd5cb4 1 1 1
53. 0x7d1db8e1403ac25229e6a091825908aafbe5c0b8 1 1 1
54. 0x1447e5c3f09da83c8f3e3ec88f72d8e07ee69288 1 1 1
55. 0x09b1f49f2e8507e42c02e7dedd6d1d1f00d2ce4f 1 1 1
56. 0x5b7d4606f14dda7cc4a33b94b06a9c114a32fa9e 1 1 1
57. 0xe9d2faf204ab4787936c0d9afdf9ec236955e055 1 1 1
58. 0x46eb9f8ea419bf7dd2d3ea46a179222c60ff43c1 1 1 1
59. 0xfe46e84affad0eb8016eaa0549a46552d19fe7a2* 1 1 1
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Table 10: 49 Contracts susceptible to the reentrancy vulnerability. * represent false positive.
Contract Address Contract Name
0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413 TheDAO
0xffcf45b540e6c9f094ae656d2e34ad11cdfdb187 Uniswap
0x0eee3e3828a45f7601d5f54bf49bb01d1a9df5ea Lend.Me
0xd654bdd32fc99471455e86c2e7f7d7b6437e9179 Anonymous
0xbf78025535c98f4c605fbe9eaf672999abf19dc1 Anonymous
0xf91546835f756da0c10cfa0cda95b15577b84aa7 LedgerChannel
0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490 TheDarkDAO
0xdf4b83a451ef20b925ce39f4da2a021722688370 M_BANK
0xcead721ef5b11f1a7b530171aab69b16c5e66b6e WALLET
0x83a3a9b3068911b55a3989df0e642f487d08e424 CA_BANK
0xcb6fe98097fe7d6e00415bb6623d5fc3effa4e83 THE_BANK
0xa4e1cbf64c3b5db2a6e6f23cb5286b97d80b86e3 WWW_wallet
0xfe1b613f17f984e27239b0b2dccfb1778888dfae InstaDice
0xf5cff81d51e81596519ecf61830cb084037a2218 Anonymous
0x55791ea128a7b7fc871272d9147435a3abb3d1eb Anonymous
0x7c6220c9537946a0861d7e86f6423af526f41375 Anonymous
0xac629878277bf6a2fc46857eac4d4dd17bfa330f Anonymous
0x23a91059fdc9579a9fbd0edc5f2ea0bfdb70deb4 PrivateBank
0xb4c05e6e4cdb07c15095300d96a5735046eef999 PrivateBank
0xb93430ce38ac4a6bb47fb1fc085ea669353fd89e PrivateBank
0x95d34980095380851902ccd9a1fb4c813c2cb639 Private_Bank
0xd116d1349c1382b0b302086a4e4219ae4f8634ff Private_Bank
0x4a8d3a662e0fd6a8bd39ed0f91e4c1b729c81a38 * HODLWallet
0x4122073496955adb48e9a1dfaf6e456631b595a1 Anonymous
0x2d5df43d54ae164a912db8de092cf707b446f693 CA_BANK
0x463f235748bc7862deaa04d85b4b16ac8fafef39 PrivateBank
0xa5d6accc5695327f65cbf38da29198df53efdcf0 Private_accumulation_fund
0x59752433dbe28f5aa59b479958689d353b3dee08 Anonymous
0xaae1f51cf3339f18b6d3f3bdc75a5facd744b0b8 DEP_BANK
0x6e3c384480e71792948c29e9fc8d7b9c9d75ae8f p_bank
0xe610af01f92f19679327715b426c35849c47c657 PIGGY_BANK
0xbabfe0ae175b847543724c386700065137d30e3b PrivateBank
0xdd71e35f680bb5adc77c6d1d9ef5793598e613dc Piggy_BanK
0x62781f11b58e2caf8f28eaebc73fe711c634dcff * WRD Genesis (WRD)
0xf01fe1a15673a5209c94121c45e2121fe2903416 Anonymous
0x903643251af408a3c5269c836b9a2a4a1f04d1cf SysEscrow
0xb7c5c5aa4d42967efe906e1b66cb8df9cebf04f7 keepMyEther
0xb3e396f500df265cdfde30ec6e80dbf99bee9e96 pg_bank
0x8ce53575e1ce89131b370cbed602ce8cfa4f7805 Anonymous
0x26b8af052895080148dabbc1007b3045f023916e Anonymous
0x0eb68f34efa0086e4136bca51fc4d0696580643e BetingHouse
0x72f60eca0db6811274215694129661151f97982e DecentralizedExchanges
0xd4cd7c881f5ceece4917d856ce73f510d7d0769e DecentralizedExchanges
0x3ac969b43affc4e0684dc52dc3072b109d0e348d Bank
0x3e64b1a66f3aa6f0765b093540481aa690c2b9b7 Anonymous
0x4b23577c0672ab1e436097b7daceadb75e5721c6 Pg_Bank
0x857a8d8aa8d83562f9118405335bd4a1fb523317 I_bank
0xfdb27beadad89f8282c51f5e5a4e77c1f19d7220 CB_Bank
0x5d84fc93a6a8161873a315c233fbd79a88280079 * Exchange
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Table 11: Group of attackers that exploit the bad randomness vulnerability. * represent false positive.
Creator # Contracts # Transactions
1. 0x820d115b9c982260edaa1741812d1f85132736b5 9 22257
2. 0x825d5d0df3b2d59f69cc673f041ca91a296b8183 2 6577
3. 0x78931c77e417244f283f09eb116a9b98ce57cb4f 10 2628
4. 0x53062a2cb2402919f257a3d520bbef73c3d57673 4 1351
5. 0x8871759b2530fee82cd1b31c534252a1db707b0b 3 1333
6. 0xeb54f65775e6a2a42e243823d86486a64fd1f0d6 4 1314
7. 0xb5f5655e8be6039173fef87191e53c86f799f7ca 4 597
8. 0x3b43721d9ef5de30f7ccae187a07897e2673cf19 3 570
9. 0xe7eca2a94e9d59848f3c1e1ffaacd881d4c3a4f2 6 499
10. 0xc1a065a2d29995692735c82d228b63df1732030e 6 431
11. 0x87614f3c2deca896a8e71f9662e5ae68736fe206 4 376
12. 0x32dc12b8f205e22faa39de17da3c44335286761c 14 373
13. 0x8537aa2911b193e5b377938a723d805bb0865670 4 359
14. 0x6fae851378b9c1499d4fe9d01895c515365ed9dc 5 282
15. 0xc1e3be3b4c9f24941f14986da505265aab57ea61 1 215
16. 0xad5723c4f7b4c478e09688f96a7a477b0d1196fd 3 185
17. 0x7ad54ee3255b05392aa52942d946fb0664a6c14e 1 102
18. 0x2ca860ad6b4d2c79a88fb5b1628810f2bf487287 2 89
19. 0xef398210245fb5a173965e0cef80cfa53cb85df7 1 76
20. 0x7f2f933ee22b802935449911fc8c7f35fb00409c 1 68
21. 0x20c945800de43394f70d789874a4dac9cfa57451 20 65
22. 0xb14ba25ada2912b27c0586a6f038583bbf0a8646 1 60
23. 0xdead9824214b40e672e9058cab9248faabaaccb4 1 59
24. 0xb3e20b057cbf2c0d9d099bac6772af0c948c6ade 3 56
25. 0x84ecb387395a1be65e133c75ff9e5fcc6f756db3 3 46
26. 0x0f2f24d9ecc21fec00c9ef065dd3e01010b05568 3 40
27. 0xf31ef7ae2323459ffedd10b4f0b056d51634f5d5 1 37
28. 0x0f007aa14325f3d477e19fbe8a022ce2418c12d5 3 34
29. 0x0040a706fc31f3ca4b52ea128f984a808504b0c0 2 29
30. 0x3d133759dfebaccbb2252df6a423fbf152ed48f4 2 25
31. 0x642fbb45842764a9b5e56bfb1e9b0b1fd0ced490 9 24
32. 0x501f51187acfbbfb711166dea9ee5bbf77c6c2d8 * 3 23
33. 0x8981ce4369dc1e24663a241a24a8d1eab9aa5c96 3 19
34. 0x860e21abcc3b9c10635a65c8a3bc7f1ba692211c * 1 19
35. 0xc8fdecbf1cfe62ffae64bb7eb359ed80a7554d82 1 17
36. 0x217ad253c41fe23f2bc5706262695b54c95a7442 11 17
37. 0x125d657d5cd16bf4864a2850d3f2541d9a0f3b50 1 14
38. 0xea4c732d337a61677518a5483ff4b57bde2b9097 1 10
39. 0x80028f80c7d5959c3eaf45a95bf3a1a0724352f6 1 9
40. 0xd1e88e048fc8f8ba954f1dbb260c811c0793c67b 1 9
41. 0xddf543429e415a262e7617d76196621cb8375d20 4 8
42. 0xb7784f0b98d049bb73435044c5879cc78365f168 * 2 8
43. 0x11e52c75998fe2e7928b191bfc5b25937ca16741 7 7
44. 0x85cf54dd216997bcf324c72aa1c845be2f059299 1 7
45. 0x687256e8b7221518c096a4ff1824554b3b26ee5e 1 7
46. 0x15fda64fcdbca27a60aa8c6ca882aa3e1de4ea41 7 7
47. 0x73ba784a1a8f5531e9ebf3d4fddba0b90ef72beb 1 7
48. 0xcdbddd0477ffe1b4b150aaebbc03d1cb816766af 1 6
49. 0xbb81cd73c786799505feb9dfed0760dfc5aaedbf 1 6
50. 0xc54100fc034d412c21ba92ccf2d916374ac22555 1 5
51. 0xd06e2cf7f623457d9660723a15b969f6724a376f 4 4
52. 0x1b0dff20922e219276ff0a3496afdc02d92948a2 * 1 4
53. 0x0d7f11536f61ff477bcb4f440d677296de60e7d3 2 3
54. 0x231f702070aacdbde867b323996a96fed8adca10 2 3
55. 0x58f34b689444902a90e46c9b15019919a3458507 1 3
56. 0x04528fb91840ce4bcfc7390919a455d530da8ecb 1 3
57. 0x601974963ebfc94019744de0e371d12d95669f90 3 3
58. 0x31f197a7374ca0712a483232f661cf52f08581e2 1 2
59. 0x8e6e2c3af26f20c82574109ffd461a7520fd9f95 2 2
60. 0xc1a9e3ff212d401cb83b1db43422eab141cb1ca7 2 2
61. 0x0eaf6b9bee938435f71c1c3f8b998ee338d7b8c3 2 2
62. 0x2041c60347ba953d3715c8519a12345b69cf7168 2 2
63. 0xa78bbf97033e534c54b0a4fa62aa77b652ae4097 * 2 2
64. 0xb28f3c831c676276288e4dd7230c6b67d8b35384 1 2
65. 0x2ab1604ce06f26904cafb5094a7789d2451f96eb 1 1
66. 0x50bdd6ce3554123fb5040139e16b22787768296f 1 1
67. 0x524984fe428acff3d809bdf4d1fa44f53a713b07 1 1
68. 0x358ddb3bec0b9aee58006c99ec04abc25e56a71b 1 1
69. 0x0242f5a05c702057c9f7828678c68611fd1ef603 1 1
70. 0x32a93668e60399c67df9808b8642f812375beadb 1 1
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Creator # Contracts # Transactions
71. 0xe432c5017d18fc17a85d69a73548b803a99119d8 1 1
72. 0x1a1fc363665144b6f322e4950b4458c79a6f7a66 1 1
73. 0x2d819d8b01291401df2bb2b38956231ccf321dc6 1 1
74. 0xa20c551aa9e5f890c046a410ff910ba4e3f88650 1 1
75. 0xaef3a90a83c29ec6f0c2171b905fadc615a1dd15 1 1
76. 0x51702659c5defe636b5b084a5ed16fd1066e6420 1 1
77. 0x81f4c798b6412e5c58311b59d99553ee9d48022d 1 1
78. 0x7e7e2bf7edc52322ee1d251432c248693ecd9e0f 1 1
79. 0x4469bc6bd2ba2acda7841c2350d0d1de7f26521f 1 1
Table 12: Vulnerable contracts susceptible to the bad randomness attack.
Contract Address Contract Name
Ponzi Game
0xa62142888aba8370742be823c1782d17a0389da1 FoMo3D Long Official (F3D)
0x205718799d502fe2c45d3afc91c3c8ccb5c0836f Vote Bhelp (Bhelp)
0xcb47c89cb17c10b719fc5ed9665bae157cac2cb1 FoMoJP
0x29488e24cfdaa52a0b837217926c0c0853db7962 SuperCard
0x0fc53f7c2659a708f46d0c4336eb8c1e0f551307 Bingo3D (B3D)
0xdd9fd6b6f8f7ea932997992bbe67eabb3e316f3c Last Winner (LW)
0xcc8aabf5199a93c6cff2495761cbb70e056b41a5 MC2long
0x8a883a20940870dc055f2070ac8ec847ed2d9918 RatScam
0x0ad3227eb47597b566ec138b3afd78cfea752de5 FoMo3Dshort
0x9872ffc47ff6ae0cbdec2f68bb88ad3169d69afc FoMo4D (F4D)
0x86d179c28cceb120cd3f64930cf1820a88b77d60 FoMoGame
0x460a5098248f4aa1a46eec6aac78b7819ea01c42 Suoha
0x7ebd56cc7c1d14788ed09179f67cdcf2778c6535 JCLYLong
0x52083b1a21a5abc422b1b0bce5c43ca86ef74cd1 FoMo3Dshort
0x24da016c06941ec2c92be28e0a2b2e679f0d1dc7 FoMo3DLightning
0x9edc05176ae3bba98c3112ac842269b225e55722 JCLYLong
0x0b5da756938e334c97ce20715e32a4a8fea12ba9 F3Dultra
0x6de7fd35c2f9b25b0efe85621306e9de41eab97f F3DGo
0xb73f8f75cc233ec7a451d44859e06167e47c1942 LastUnicorn
0xf9ba0955b0509ac6138908ccc50d5bd296e48d7d FoMo3D Fast Official (F3D)
0x0f90ef4e2526e3d1791862574f9fb26a0f39ec86 F3DPLUS
0x58232003b3d18021acfc9213d27d6f8b72f4f029 Rich3D
0x820dfa17d30f938dc2c172b716630a06ec759d99 FullFOMO
0xa9b9805d0fed371cec8fb8a8f2300f279c47ba53 F4Kings
0x3664be8ec8a66e8dab9dfa48e5092f576edab746 FOMO Loop (LOOP)
0xab4e6f106fff4e80f8d0689c61d235fc430f629e HX
0x51a5271ec514c3065d9de2d8e95051989f7d53ab imfomo Long Official (imfomo)
0x39ffccecc551f35f8dfcb52c8c01060919aed1ea FoMo3DUnlimited
0x43312c23f2e8fe11390329c15079717c5b27b8b9 F3DLink
0xda8d7ff0d043848a689125e2c7ab87b16a0cbe81 SnowStorm
0xb2b30d39074c52a60283a26f238abff31fcb4217 SnowStorm
0x103d98686ced96f1d2cf1a0d1eabdd63c9c027e4 F3DShop
0xcc55c087d027c5dd3b0f3c28280c3a3fdd798c8b FoMo4D (F4D)
0xf5ad74c2a4deeeffd1e5e27d1221a4ca33214277 NTE 3D Official (NTE3D)
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0x05aa2fdf9f58b426b49900834cce0565d88e52eb Bingo4Beast Long Official (B4B)
0xfc812ef2661a99cd21ab452edcbab505583fe40b Famo
0x202d16c018d31d60fe179a67901444565e0f0cc7 FoMo6D (F6D)
0xb6cadfb7d4d900f8152954a58bff03901a57c2e2 FoMo3K
0x7b20471396cedf00cd1f65eca27fdb3ca1643b6c SpicyPot
0x7802b44acc5f37b4843d10f7c4eaec1c36bc7d2d OK3D (OK3D)
0xb3640c4e8b8317cbe65aa4f20c7851996e6b406c NTech3DLong
0x5cd17346bc2b8b3b04251dfea7763dbc70cceaf7 FoMo3D Asia (Official) (F3DA)
0x20c3811a83fad33dc7a0c8ee2d1e773ddf3b7d44 Damo
0xe69ba47f38ee8ab38696014c19b547a4aa955480 XMG Long Official (XMG)
0x603f234b6c1cf8104a0791a1cc32ee73cd73cab7 FoMo6D (F6D)
0x1ca95b07290db4cb91f9efc9060a8df2a8eaff00 F5D (F5D)
0xf1ae594cefee0bf519f227f3262ee2a851b14b9a FoMo3D World (F3DW)
0xe19c616ff1efc079792df6b5583d2cf3e6e77d10 The Winner (WINNER)
0x8c74f1ed536e79de5cb225f035bc989ae84493f7 FomoSuper
0x6db943251e4126f913e9733821031791e75df713 ReadyPlayerONE
0x2a71ae354d82c16233416e96374ef324b12a5646 Must Be Hit 4D (MBT4D)
0xf5fe6b716c0cd0e88059d8b3d8385c086012eb0e Gold medal winner Official (Gold)
0x3bb5e74f7ff56e0b64d326f8ec07236aa4a07260 Greedy
Russian Roulette
0x0ab2c9e20aa31fd3a3728a86f2526cca06a2b76d RussianRoulette
0xef02c45c5913629dd12e7a9446455049775eec32 RuletkaIo
Airdrop Mechanism of BEB Token
0x4669f488ce2df5b95ced6c058eca6034b9c25921 LUCK
0x2e72dd0a0fb5d4f40d3c68f42a4abef2a99075fc LUCK
0xf64094e8cd7100b8cda6352a5954c0f6217659f1 LUCK
Slot Machine
0x71c11a3b3a13a2e4a23c760722691952319ac7b9 Roulette
0x5cfa2f4ff77bbd15d6415e33c16c2c85096cce4a MyDice
0x510467f65a600926af2ed565419ad98cf1f706ed Slotthereum
0x755ebf95883f9167d51a4ea95035e16421be865d EtherDie
0x419a058dca91d152d36c4c6888aafd3890ce7429 EtherDie
0x0b2d2b5e550f77ee125d3898ead74331ccf1da76 EtherDie
0x8eb58b6239cc369ef8bf0bc5f41d8b5aac5f8b90 EtherDie
0x13fbbea6f440c2fa56ff8f90ff984118a2df0500 ETHGIVER
0x9d8542f45611e043a0379779eadc1071c6332763 Anonymous
0x28cc60c7c651f3e81e4b85b7a66366df0809870f Ethereum_doubler
0x233820087a752349ee20daab1c18e0b7c546d3f6 Anonymous
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0x87f31ab270ecf848663d64d3ab0998de2088a226 SlotMachine
0x2e089902dec3406b548b6a014516695a1e5e3104 PIPOTFlip
0xcb4fc459c926e5e10b698009f6f3c1ed658faef7 Coinflip
0x9ac63e7a52247b05ac878f1ede7b1e1285a54843 BountyHunter
0xf767fca8e65d03fe16d4e38810f5e5376c3372a8 LuckyDoubler
0x46ee746d396bb2808e8fa41dc658036aee51d857 EthMash
0xdbac44c23964a8913ac102b78bb85bf58b01e5c6 EJackpot
0x30fe5c5197a761ac173bd29869d2c7a9e1770126 InstaLottos
0x4429d240b0ef7617cb415edaec5e9050eee943bf Anonymous
0x5caeebfab3cd8655e04692351237efb7462c9d8f VfSE_Lottery
0x46b6434711a2dfab29a7069844968752db387ddc DiceRoll
0x9d8542f45611e043a0379779eadc1071c6332763 Anonymous
0xb0e6cebb35fbea49a46b568cced98173c58f36de Anonymous
0x48198311ac8d81929c0e67e00dfc789b706178e9 Slot
0xd6b3d9e44f767f0c178f60d24fb186ba49bc444a Slot
0xf509f55692aeab739605a1815562c2f898fa6fd4 LuckyNumbers
Dragon King
0xa03b5ea89ede664ccb3b4a49c5b25f6a4658e174 DragonKing
0x0c7f4cddb7460ec4170466634f97cfbbeeda1961 Anonymous
0x0aad44d047661bd190fb45640072c949d8129ef3 Anonymous
0x3bc5bd64fff1b1a4054732abf23d8b100d991031 FootBall
0x9ce0b408a4f15d222f6624895687efa1e1a4247b ETHERKUN
Lottery
0x3d60f58f8bf0c4d45646116257f2717281a3d471 BREBuy
0x103992432927f7ed1a5b3dc0e34186f80b16d93c Tiles
0x6a21a83da9863d929a3d70c55bee2536fa48d544 GalaxyETHNormalJackpot
0xb3ac6256c0dcaaf45b1e7c60993ed5edee10e1fa Revolution
0x6dcdce5853cfbcbe4e3eb15c9ab2277983387cd9 Revolution
False Positives
0x2248bfa3babbf53fdc058167584a642d13eebfed Anonymous
0x7c91ca2620cfbaabdf440007c3b0ef5a4ac22370 Anonymous
0x2fc79fa0f714d588835698ebe1965c511c03bb57 Anonymous
0xc89137ceeb35115ed3a3cb0e3f5e865da963c51c Anonymous
0x8c60d767daf8cbc8e9a4899fb2eb0bbf9bbf8c20 Anonymous
0xb77feddb7e627a78140a2a32cac65a49ed1dba8e GeneScience
0x7c91ca2620cfbaabdf440007c3b0ef5a4ac22370 Anonymous
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